Navy Executive Safety Board (NESB) Flag Panel Meeting

11 October 2006

Agenda

- WELCOME - VCNO/COMNAVSAFECEN
- OSC CHAIR COMMENTS
  - RADM Starling
- BRIEF: ORM PERFORMANCE GAP AND BARRIERS ANALYSIS
  - Briefer: Mr. Jeremy Wilson, Human Performance Center
- BRIEF: ORM ISSUES AND STRATEGIES
  - Briefer: CAPT Neubauer, NAVSAFECEN
- FLAG LEVEL DISCUSSION
- BRIEF: UPDATE ON PMV PILOT PROGRAMS, MISHAP INVESTIGATION THRESHOLDS AND ENDORSEMENT CHAIN
  - Briefer: Mr. Hank Spolnicki, CNIC
- FLAG LEVEL DISCUSSION
- BRIEF: IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF HIGH RISK SAILORS
  - Briefer: RADM Starling
- FLAG LEVEL DISCUSSION
- FUNDING SAFETY INITIATIVES
  - Briefer: CAPT Bump, OPNAV N8
- FLAG LEVEL DISCUSSION
- CLOSING - VCNO

Operations Safety Committee (OSC) Chairman comments

Operational Risk Management Performance Gap and Barriers Analysis

Briefing to:
Navy Executive Safety Board
October 2006

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Purpose and Approach

Purpose:

- Assess:
  - Gap between desired and current ORM performance
  - Barriers affecting performance

Scope:

- On-duty and off-duty ORM
- Barriers affecting Aviation, Surface, and Submarine communities

Approach:

- Examine the whole system by assessing ORM performance gaps and barriers for the Organization and Individuals
- NPRST Navy-wide “Quick Poll” for Active Duty Personnel
- Review relevant Navy Instructions and guidance
- Review research on human performance
- Develop a way ahead strategy

ORM Performance Gap Findings

	Required State	Gap
Personnel	**All Navy personnel know what ORM is and use it in everyday life on and off the job**	**Self-reported Knowledge** •90-99% reported having heard of ORM, knowing what ORM is, how to use it, and why it should be used •16% could identify the steps and principles **Self-reported Usage** •96% use On-duty (64% daily) •90% use Off-duty (53% daily)
Organizational	**Compliance with OPNAVINST 3500.39B**	•Responsibilities have either not been accomplished, or •Have not been accomplished consistently •Implementation was not the same across TYCOMs reviewed

ORM Performance Barriers Findings

	Organizational (TYCOM Commands)	Personnel (Self-report)	
		On-Duty	Off-Duty
Top 3	•Execution •Training Resources •Policy and Procedures	•Lack of incentives •Lack of time •Getting the job done quickly is more important	•Getting the tasks done quickly is more important •Lack of incentives •Lack of time
Other	•Command Culture &Climate •Fleet Perceptions	•Lack of knowledge, resources, & leadership support •Duplicates other safety guidance	•"What is done on my time is my business," application knowledge, & value

Recommendations

- **Integrate** findings with previous work
- Continue strategy to find and remove barriers
  - Use performance **drivers** to guide in-depth barrier analyses
  - Further identify & use **exemplars** to leverage what works
  - Review & implement **Science of Learning** findings
  - Explore **poll breakouts**
- Develop navy-wide assessments to further define the current State of ORM and employ regularly

Issues anticipated/unanticipated from the HPC report, and strategies for addressing them

Anticipated Findings

- 93% room for improvement in reaching ORM knowledge and usage goal
- People not hearing an actionable ORM message
- ORM implementation not standard or consistent
- Lack of clear policy, procedural guidance
- Lack of expectations and assessment feedback loops
- Availability and inadequate quality of training resources
- Inaccurate perception of ORM

Unanticipated Findings

- Lack motive drivers and incentive drivers for organizational and individual ORM performance
- Correct drivers vital to desired performance
- CPO reported most positive opinions ORM practice
- Majority report leadership practices ORM daily
- Key barriers were lack of incentives
- Majority of barriers were execution barriers

The Good News

- An overwhelming majority reported they knew how to use ORM, that ***ORM has helped them on the job, and that ORM makes a valuable contribution to workplace safety of Navy personnel***. In other positive findings, only a small percentage felt that ORM takes a back seat to performing duties, and even fewer felt that practicing ORM is less important than getting the job done.

- The majority reported seeing ***ORM practiced daily at their command***, and reporting using ORM for the planning and execution of activities from low to high risk. About half reported there were ***incentives (rewards) for using ORM,*** and slightly fewer reported there were job-related consequences (such as disciplinary action) for not using ORM.

Barriers and Strategies

Sailor Performance

Barriers

- **Knowledge and Skills Gap**

Strategies

- **Revamp delivery methods and venues**
  - Update CBT methods
  - Focus on instructors
  - Standard ORM INDOC brief
- **Change focus from Deliberate to Time Critical**
  - Junior personnel concentrate on execution vice planning
  - Focus on decision making and change monitoring

Barriers and Strategies

Sailor Performance

Barriers

- **Practice Gap**
  - Sailors perceive lower priority for ORM when pressed for time
  - Perceive OPTEMPO takes priority over ORM

Strategies

- **Take advantage of CPO support**
  - Bring ORM more strongly into CPO leadership vector
  - Meld into mentoring program

Barriers and Strategies

Organizational Performance

Barriers	Strategies
• **Policy and Guidance Gap** – Responsibilities not well defined – Lack of expectations to comply	• **Rewrite of ORM Instruction** – Finish draft by Oct 31 – Joint FFC/CPF msg • **Bring ORM into assessment processes**
• **Lack of Incentives and Drivers**	• **Work with HPC to define the drivers** – Build ORM requirements into advancement exams

Barriers and Strategies

Science of Learning Performance

Barriers

- **Sailor and Command responsibilities unclear**
- **Learning objectives lacking**
- **Validation of learning results needed**

Strategies

- **Rewrite of ORM Instruction**
  - Better define responsibilities
  - Better define desired end state
- **Continue HPC Study**
  - Define objectives and learning methods
  - Validate effectiveness of methods
- **Change focus to Time Critical**

NESB Discussion

Update on PMV pilot programs, mishap investigation thresholds and endorsement chain

OSSC Working Group Actions

Traffic Safety / Recreational Off-Duty Safety (TS/RODS)

- Met 12-14 September
- Initiated two pilot programs for root cause analysis
- Developed mishap endorsement process for PMV/RODS

Occupational Safety & Health (OSH)

- Met 20-21 September
- Targeting Naval Safety Strategy POA&M tasks
- Focus on OSHA Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) and Lost Work Day initiatives

Training

- Navy Education and Training Command (NETC) stood up working group 3-4 October
- Focused on Navy Safety Training Continuum with OSC
- Updating Naval Training Systems Plan (NTSP) for Safety

Data Management

- Naval Safety Center (NSC) awarded contract for evaluating all legacy safety management systems
- Focus on single safety management system

Short-Term: Root Cause Tools

Objective: Conduct 3 investigations/Pilot to identify most effective **root cause** tool

- **Pilot 1: Naval Safety Center (NSC) Investigation Template**
  - 2 PMV mishap investigations underway
  - Initial feedback indicates template requires further refinement for root cause identification
  - Expected pilot completion date: Mid-November
- **Pilot 2: REASON Software**
  - 3 PMV and 1 RODS mishap investigations underway
  - Requires trained investigator to assist unit investigation
  - Expected pilot completion date: Mid-November

Short-Term: Process Improvements

Objective: Emphasize Navy commitment to reduce PMV/RODS mishaps

Current State

- Investigations not required for PMV/RODS mishaps
- No current endorsement process exists

Recommendations

- **DECISION**: Require root cause investigations for all Class A/B PMV/RODS mishaps
  - Need data to identify root cause trends over time
- **DECISION**: Implement **endorsement process** for Class A PMV/RODS mishap investigation reports
  - Strengthens accountability by increasing visibility
  - Requires tracking of corrective actions

Short-Term: Next Steps

- **Complete pilot evaluations for REASON and NSC Investigation Template**
  - Select root cause investigative tool(s)
  - If necessary, evaluate other investigation tools (e.g. Apollo, TapRoot)
- **Develop Investigation Protocol**
- **Issue ALNAV message to all units**
  - Direct Class A/B PMV/RODS investigations
  - Direct First Flag/Echelon III/II endorsement of investigation reports
  - Implement Investigation Protocol
- **Revise OPNAVINST 5102.1D**

Long-Term: Safety Risk Management

Objective: Identify Traffic Safety program elements with the greatest potential effectiveness

- **Develop Traffic Safety Risk Model**
  - Use modeled and approved AT/FP risk-based strategy
  - Validate model through subject matter experts (SMEs)
- **Leverage Enlisted community and SMEs to populate risk model data elements**
- **Conduct cost-benefit analysis of Traffic Safety program elements**
- **Optimize limited resources based on analysis**

Questions

Endorsement Process



NESB Discussion

Operations Safety Committee
High Risk Personnel

Where we are

- Fleet Direction - ID & Target High-Risk Sailors
  - Standards & Conduct IPT
  - OSC/OSSC Initiatives

- Goal: Reduction of Operational/PMV Fatalities



What we have done

- Forward-Leaning Initiatives
  - Best Practices
    - USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
      - "Sailor Excellence Ashore"
    - USS CARL VINSON
      - "People-Centric Program"
- Prospective Tools & Barriers
  - "CO's Tool Box" vs. Legal Review

Where we want to be
"Street-to-Fleet Concept"



Way ahead

- Establish a process owner
- Enhance current unit-shaped efforts
- Gather, share and refine best practices
- Address barriers
- Institutionalize

Executive Safety Board Funding Process

Purpose

- The initial task: Naval Safety Center Staff requested OPNAV N8 assistance to identify a process for allocating resources with a high return on investment (ROI).
- During the 15 August 2006 ESB, VCNO indicated the proposed process was too much of a top down approach that could lead to issues not being properly vetted at lower levels


Navy POA&M Update

Obj #	Task #	Sub Task #	Task Description	Due date	Lead Command/ Agency	Supporting Commands/ Agencies	Amplification	Status
3.5	3.5.1		MORE CLOSELY ALIGN SAFETY IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESSES					
		3.5.1A	Ensure criteria for ESOH is in all applicable capabilities (JCIDS) documents; ICD, CPD, CDD and ORDs. (Initial capabilities documents-MS-A, Capabilities Development Documents- MS-B, Capabilities Design Documents - MS-C and legacy Operational Requirements	1-May-06	NSC (N09FB)		Central to mission and function of N09FB. (Support by System Safety Advisory Board / N1, N4, N7/N8, N09, N91/N93).	
4.5	4.5.1		ESTABLISH POLICY AT THE BASE AND REGIONS TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF TRAFFIC SAFETY REGULATIONS					
		4.5.1A	Require base police to report all "on-base only" traffic violations to service members/employee command.	1-Jul-06	CNIC	Navy Regions	Incorporate reporting requirement in CNIC Region Instructions. Pursue revision of OPNAVINST 5100.12G/H to include reporting requirement. Note: (Similar to HASP report).	
5.1	5.1.1		IMPROVE THE CAPABILITIES/INTEGRATION OF THE WEB-ENABLED SAFETY SYSTEM					
		5.1.1B	Convene a Configuration Control Board to evaluate temporary term reduction of required data fields during the zero based review period.	1-Jun-06	NSC	Echelon 2s	Reduction in required data fields will increase mishap reporting in the near term by balancing need for mishap analysis and leading indicators with the burden of inputting data on the user.	
	5.2.2		IMPROVE MISHAP AND HAZARD REPORTING ACCOUNTABILITY					
		5.2.2B	and make changes, as required.	1-Jul-06	NSC	Echelon 2s		
6.3	6.3.1		LINK SAFETY EXPENDITURES TO EXPECTED BENEFITS THROUGH USE OF BUSINESS CASE ANALYSES					
			Determine the process for allocating				NSC draft process flow chart and obtain ESB	
6.7	6.7.1		MAKE PROGRAMATIC IMPROVEMENTS TO DON'S SAFETY PROFESSION					
		6.7.1B	Improve the expertise of Navy civilian and military safety personnel by implementing policies which promote and financially support professional certification, e.g. as Certified Safety Professionals (CSP) and Certified Industrial Hygienists (CIH).	1-Aug-06	NSC (N09F)	OPNAV N11/ BUMED	Monitor the number of certified safety professionals annually. Review OPNAVINST 5100.23G and 5100.19.	
6.9	6.9.1		MANDATE AND RESOURCE TRAFFIC SAFETY AND OFF-DUTY SAFETY PROGRAMS UNDER INSTALLATION SAFETY OFFICES					
			Continue funding of current CNIC Traffic					

This brief recommends a revised process

What Changed?

- A step was added in the process to have safety solutions with high returns on investment reviewed by either the Operations Safety Committee or Operations Support Safety Committee, or both if appropriate.
- This enables further review of the issue and if appropriate assignment to a sub-committee for resolution or more detail.
- The expected outcome would be return of the solution to the ESB Executive Agent (COMNAVSAFECEN) as:
  - a valid solution but funding cannot be resolved by the committee
  - a solution that can be implemented within current constraints
  - An invalid solution that should be discarded.

Executive Safety Board Funding Process

① The ESB or a Safety Committee identify a safety related solution with an expected high return on investment

② Executive Agent for the ESB (COMNAVSAFECEN) identifies the issue to either the Operations Senior Safety Committee or Operations Support Safety Committee. The assigned committee reports to Executive Agent that the proposed solution:

- is a valid solution but funding cannot be resolved by the committee
- will implemented within current constraints
- will not solve the problem and should be discarded.

③ Safety Center forwards the validated funding issue to the Executive Safety Board (ESB). If the requirement and funding level are approved by the ESB based on merit, the requirement is passed to:

④[a] The Navy Enterprise Board of Directors (NE BOD) to identify Enterprise Domain(s) or Enabler(s) responsible for developing funding options.

⑤[a] Options are developed by the Enterprise(s) or Enablers(s)

④[b] N8/FMB tasked to develop corporate funding options for Safety issues impacting multiple domains (funding will be derived from multiple domain(s)/ enabler(s))

⑤[b] Options are developed in OPNAV internally

⑥[a/b] Enterprise or OPNAV approved funding options will be coordinated with N8/FMB to ensure executability and proper timing.

⑦ N8/FMB notifies Naval Safety Centers of intended solution

Executive Safety Board - Navy Enterprise Board Commonality



Similar Membership

Enterprise Process



Five Navy Enterprises
Naval Air Enterprise (NAE)
Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE)
Under Sea Enterprise (USE)
Naval Network FORCENet Enterprise (NNFE)
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)

Five Enablers
Manpower, Training and Education (MPT&E)
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (AT&L)
Installations
Health Care
Science & Technology (S&T)

Summary

The goal is to provide an executable process that considers the perspectives of both Warfare Enterprises and Enablers; thus, providing them opportunity to develop options for resolving safety issues

M8 responsible to ensure executability

NESB Discussion

Closing Comments